Václav Havel and the Lithuanian Question

Luboš Švec (Charles University)

The paper discusses the approach of President Václav Havel towards the Lithuanian question and his role at the beginning of the 90s. The author argues that V. Havel’s attitude cannot be seen only in the fundamental change of Czechoslovak politics in the spirit of “return to Europe” after the fall of the Communist regime and Havel’s assumption of office as president. His view of the Baltic question had deeper roots from the time of dissent. His attitude was already expressed in dissent, when Charter 77 formulated in an open letter in May 1989 to the German Chancellor a call to abolish the consequences of the Pact Molotov-Ribbentrop and to support the right of the Baltic nations to self-determination. The question is whether and how the principled attitude of the human rights policy was reflected in real politics, after the opposition had come to power in 1990.

Similarly to the policy of most Western states, V. Havel supported a non-violent political solution to the conflict. He considered Gorbachev´s approach to the Baltic question a litmus test of the integrity of the Soviet democratization process. Václav Havel was among the first statesmen to speak out in support of Lithuania. At his invitation, the Speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, came to Prague at the end of  May 1990. Following V. Landsbergis´s visit to Prague, the Presidential Office in Prague formulated a gradual conception for the advancement of bilateral Czechoslovak-Lithuanian relations and internationalization of the Baltic case, aiming at de jure recognition in the future. Regarding the Lithuanian issue international, not internal (ethnic) conflict between the republic and the Soviet centre, V. Havel defended the integration of the Baltic republics into all-European institutions. The Baltic question became the first serious conflict between Soviet and new Czechoslovak politics, although Havel’s sharp condemnation of the Soviet policy of gross coercion and aggression did not yet mean immediate de jure recognition of the Baltic states. The Baltic issue was not isolated; it can be considered part of a fundamental change in Czechoslovak foreign policy from a former Soviet servile satellite to a distinct European democratic value policy.